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ABSTRACT 
 
Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances. (December 2009)  
Brian N. Hicks, B.A., University of Texas; M.A., Texas Tech University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Guy D. Whitten 
 
 Many countries are dependent upon capital flows for their balance of payments 
accounts. Sources of expenditures include foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
investment (PI) and remittances. While the determinants of FDI and PI have been 
extensively analyzed, the analyses of remittance flows from host to home countries are 
largely lacking and wide-ranging. Factors predominantly not considered are domestic 
institutions which support or encourage international remittance exchange. Nations 
routinely desire to control international immigration and capital movement. 
Consequently they adopt domestic policies which create and enforce institutions that 
manage both capital and labor mobility across borders. Additionally, researchers 
commonly neglect to consider the impact of both the supply and demand factors 
simultaneously, or in other words, the domestic condition (home and host) which both 
push and pull migrants to migrate and remit. Further, given the non-dyadic nature of the 
data, there arises a need to „regionalize‟ the data. To test the effects of variations in 
immigration institutional attributes, I employ a pooled data set of approximately 104 
nations from 1990 to 2004. Controlling for existing explanations and regional influences, 
iv 
 
I find that domestic institutions have a significant impact on the ability of an individual 
to migrate to a host country and to eventually remit back to their country of origin.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Foreign capital is a crucial asset to countries, allowing them to maintain positive 
balance of payment accounts. Capital flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
portfolio investment (PI), are routinely analyzed by researchers
1
. However, another 
prominent source of capital has often taken a back seat. Workers' remittances are 
“current transfers by migrants who are employed or intend to remain employed for more 
than a year in another economy [host] in which they are considered residents” (World 
Bank, 2006). Although they still only constitute a small percentage of overall foreign 
funds, they have been growing steadily and substantially over the past few decades 
(Wucker, 2004). In 1975, migrant workers dispersed remittances from the U.S. valued at 
approximately $2.98 billion, while in 2003, the totals came close to $90 billion 
(Aggarwal et al., 2006, 1). By 2006, the total had reached $142 billion (World Bank, 
2006). 
The growth in totals exclusively from the U.S. is astounding, which makes it 
even more remarkable that such little research has been devoted to the causes and 
impediments of these flows. Only recently have remittances been recognized as a 
prominent source of capital. Yet, existing research has primarily focused on case-studies 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of Comparative Political Studies. 
 
 
1
 PI is minimally defined as passive holdings of securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or other financial 
assets, none of which entails active management or control of the securities' issuer by the investor. When 
such control exists, it is known as foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2006). The distinction from 
remittances is these are invested into a company whereas remittances largely go to households. 
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(Funkhouser, 2005; Rivera, 2005), evaluated solely effects of remittances (Aggarwal et 
al., 2006; Wucker, 2004; Appleyard, 1989; Kapur and Singer, 2006; Kurland, 2006), or 
only considered economic factors as relating to remittances (Rivera, 2005; Buch et al., 
2002; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004). 
The lack of dedicated and conclusive research in the area of remittances provides 
an opportunity to not only extend existing theory but to offer novel conjecture as to the 
broad causes and promotions of remittance flows. Beyond the customarily applied 
economic and social causes of remittances is the emphasis on the importance of 
migration. Logically it would be impossible to send remittances without actually having 
migrated to a foreign nation. Therefore, it is imperative to consider influences of 
migration, specifically national or international policies. Despite the importance of 
migration to remittance flows, an individual must still have the ability to earn an income 
(capital), and subsequently the desire and ability to return the earnings to their family in 
the home country. 
This contemplation of factors that affect labor and capital mobility between 
nations implies a need to evaluate dynamics which inhibit or promote these mobilities, 
specifically domestic institutions. States desire to promote or discourage labor and/or 
capital mobility. They will often construct specific institutions to control mobility. 
Nations have been known to be protectionists with regards to the exchange of labor and 
capital across their borders. Inflow of unwarranted labor can lead to issues of 
unemployment, while excessive outflow of capital is often viewed as a loss of income. 
Therefore, countries enact barriers in order to limit capital and labor mobility. 
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However, as seen with the unprecedented growth of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and trade agreements in the last half of the 20
th
 century, states are more willing to 
open their borders (Haftel and Thompson, 2006; USITA, 2008). Countries enact 
domestic institutions which endorse labor inflow to alleviate manpower shortages. 
Similarly, they will routinely pass domestic legislation aimed at encouraging 
international capital exchange to foster international investment. With specific regard to 
remittances, states encourage (or reduce restrictive institutions) this type of outflow in 
order to drive it out from underground and subsequently tax its international movement. 
The lack of consideration for host state domestic institutions which bind or 
promote international capital and labor mobility is troubling but not the only issue with 
extant remittance literature. Much of the existing research that attempted to assess 
remittance flows more generally often disregarded the complications in the data relating 
to the unknown specific source and/or destination of remittances. The greatest sources of 
data on remittances (the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators) only offer data in 
aggregate, non-dyadic format. Because considerations of economic, social and political 
supply (those which „push' individuals into seeking foreign employment and/or present 
them with ample earnings to send back home) and demand (those that „pull' an 
individual toward a superior opportunity for employment and/or entice them to send any 
available wages back home) influences must be considered, it is impossible to determine 
the exact destination or supply of remittances based on this abundantly available data 
source. 
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The inability to establish the destination of remittance outflows and supply of 
remittance inflows means that researchers cannot accurately incorporate host and home 
influences simultaneously. This is problematic because as noted, both supply and 
demand factors related to both home and host countries affect remittance flows. 
Therefore, when considering these factors, the average economic, political, and social 
environment of all the relevant and surrounding nations of the host country must be 
incorporated simultaneously
2
. This method allows for a more generalized incorporation 
of the supply and demand factors. The method itself is not perfect but provides an 
improved process of introducing all the relevant factors which impact remittance flows. 
This paper seeks to advance extant remittance theory by considering the 
influence of variations in domestic capital and labor institutions. At the same time, I 
intend to broaden current research by evaluating the causes of remittances beyond 
standard economic variables, applying a macro-level analysis, and assessing the impact 
of regional or contextual influences. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
The first section presents some descriptive statistics on flows of remittances and offers a 
review of the existing theory as to the causes of remittances. The second section 
discusses potential domestic institutions which are designed promote labor and capital 
mobility. The third addresses the supply and demand nature of both labor and capital 
flows while emphasizing the importance of regional contextual factors. The fourth 
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 The initial consideration of pertinent host countries uses an aggregate means of analyzing the theorized 
causes of remittance outflows. Other operationalizations of coding the host region are considered and 
included as robustness checks. 
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section details the design of the project while the fifth describes the method of analysis. 
The next presents and evaluates the results. The final section concludes the findings. 
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2. REMITTANCES 
 
Remittances represent the second largest form of capital for emerging market 
economies (Aggarwal et al., 2006). They also tend to be steady, making them an 
advantageous form of financial inflows (Wucker, 2004; Aggarwal et al., 2006). 
Developing economies reliance on remittances allows them to buffer themselves from 
the often unpredictable and volatile international capital (FDI and PI) markets. Further, 
remittances are used to support not just individuals but also entire families, and often 
benefit local communities through the “multiplier effect as money circulates among 
businesses” (Wucker, 2004, 37). Remittances are growing at a double-digit annual rate 
and totaled more than $223 billion in developing countries (Buch et al., 2002). The 
steady rise of global paid remittances (outflows) can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Global Real Remittance Outflows (1990-2004) 
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Even though the importance of remittance flows into developing economies is 
apparent, developed nations have often taken steps to dissuade the flow of this capital. 
Developed nations prefer or are more tolerant toward the external flight of capital in the 
forms of FDI and PI. These capital movements require investment which commonly 
results in a return, which is more often than not redistributed within the originating 
nation
3
 (Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen, 2007). On the other hand, remittances rarely 
result in any returns. They are generally invested within the destination nation
4
 but are 
often not sent back to the originating nation (Rivera, 2005; Kapur and Singer, 2006). 
Unlike FDI or PI, remittances embody a completely different type of financial 
flow. They are sent directly into the pockets of individuals, routinely bypassing 
governments and multinational corporations. Remittances also tend to be much more 
reliable and constant over time. They are less subjective to the whims of volatile 
international markets (Rivera, 2005). In addition, they are usually sent for familial or 
benevolent reasons rather than investment and return. 
This general lack of reciprocal capital movement (in the form of investment and 
return flows back into the originating nation) provides host nations with incentives to 
restrict capital movements related to remittances. States often have restrictive barriers to 
remittance outflows, though they may be geared more broadly toward other types of 
international capital exchange. Further, with regards to remittances, these barriers are not 
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 In this scenario the originating nation is the one that harbors the individuals or company who made the 
original investment. 
4
 In this scenario the destination nation is the one in which the remittances are remitted into.  
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exclusive to actual capital exchange. States are also generally resistant to free 
international labor movements, which is also an inherent barrier to remittance flows. 
However, situations arise whereby states need or desire to open their borders to 
both labor and capital mobility. They may initiate and implement policies designed to 
reduce preexisting barriers. Consequently, the reduction of barriers or explicit promotion 
of labor and capital exchange (including explicitly or implicitly remittance flows) 
undoubtedly increases the outflow of remittances from developed nations into 
developing markets
5
. Developing markets can undertake efforts to increase the inflow of 
remittances (Spence, 2009). But, many of these efforts are moot if the ability of migrant 
labor to move into a host state and/or subsequently remit from the host state is limited by 
existing mobility barriers with the host state. Therefore, it is imperative to first identify 
the causes of labor migration into host states, causes of migrant remittances back to 
home states, and the ability (via institutions) of host states to rebuff or promote migrants' 
capacity to accomplish either. 
Because states have the ability to directly and indirectly influence remittance 
outflows, their causes and effects are potentially difficult to characterize and more varied 
and unpredictable than the data depicts (Biglaiser and DeRouen, n.d.). This possible 
inherent volatility of the determinants and effects of remittances has led to largely 
inconsistent analyses. As noted previously, existing research has generally been case 
studies, usually only concentrated on economic or social determinants, and primarily 
focused on the developing world. The conclusion reached in these analyses has varied 
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 Remittances do not move exclusively from developed to developing nations, but this is the general trend. 
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considerably. Further, they have been analyzed as both a stimulus and a retardant of 
development (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Kapur and Singer, 2006; Kapur, 2005), as 
well as having both positive and negative influences on equitable income distributions 
(Funkhouser, 1995; Stark et al., 1986). Similarly, the research assessing the predictors of 
remittance flows have been largely inconclusive. 
Despite these inconsistencies, some consensus has prevailed. A crucial predictor 
of remittances has been the migration of individuals. Developed by Stark and Bloom 
(1985), the New Labor Economics of Migration (NELM) “focuses on explaining 
remitters' behavior by viewing the household as the relevant unit for the analysis” (Buch 
et al., 2002, 6). Briefly described, NELM emphasizes the link between migrants and 
their house of origin, whereby home market failures create an incentive to send family 
members abroad to seek out needed capital and income insurance (Stark and Bloom, 
1985). From a life cycle perspective, “remittances are initially negative as the family 
bears the costs of migration, remittances increase once a salary is achieved, and 
remittances eventually fall if the migrant settles and becomes an income insurer, rather 
than supporter” (Buch et al., 2002). Implicit in this logic is that the incentives to send 
money may be different from the incentives to receive money, and the decision to 
migrate (in order to ultimately remit to support a household in a country of origin) is 
driven by both demand (the need to acquire income support and insurance) and supply 
(the availability and access of a suitable foreign location for employment and the ability 
to disperse remittances). What then affects the decision to migrate and seek out 
employment for remittances? What influences the desire to remit once a migrant has 
10 
 
found employment in a foreign country? And, can these effects be mitigated or 
controlled by ancillary institutional factors? 
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3. DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 
 
Many existing studies evaluating the determinants and impediments of capital 
flows focus on institutional factors (Daude and Stein, 2001; Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; 
Li and Resnick, 2003; Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen, 2007). They highlight the 
importance of both financial and political risks to investors when deciding when and 
where to invest. Although remitters do not invest in any tangible assets like FDI or PI 
investors, they still face similar financial and political risk related to domestic 
institutions. Migrant workers who remit face institutional barriers to both labor and 
capital mobility, both of which endanger their ability and capacity to supply their family 
in the home nation with sufficient financial support. 
There are two general institutional factors which affect remittances: the ability to 
move into a (host) nation and the ability to send capital (from income) out of the nation 
and back to an individual's nation of origin (home). Logically, a migrant cannot remit if 
they are not employed in a foreign country. But, foreign employment does not 
necessarily guarantee that the migrant can remit either because there may exist barriers 
that limit the flow of capital between nations. If these exist, then a migrant may be 
hesitant to remit, may be unable to remit, or possibly be forced to remit in a covert 
manner
6
. Further, these institutions which guide labor and capital mobility are not all 
designed the same or created with the same intent. By evaluating the variations in labor 
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 Presumably any undisclosed remittances are not measured and are therefore unable to be tested 
accurately. 
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and capital mobility conditionalities, I can more thoroughly elucidate the influence of 
institutions on remittances. 
 
3.1 LABOR MOBILITY 
Situations arise in which states may attempt to enact barriers to entry which 
restrict access to foreign labor. Opening up borders runs the risk of inducing a flood of 
unwanted immigrants. Even when safeguards and restrictions on the number or types of 
immigrants are established, countries are rarely able to fully control immigrant 
populations. This allows illegal immigrants to enter, go unchecked, and subsequently 
avoid some of the benefits of foreign employment (i.e. taxes) while also producing the 
problem of abuses of foreign labor (i.e. salaries below minimum wage) (Huggins and 
Hicks, 2009). To alleviate many of these negative effects, countries often resort to 
creating and enforcing numerous stringent institutions
7
. Although not perfect, extensive 
and restrictive labor mobility institutions minimize the ability of foreign labor to enter a 
host state and subsequently remit. 
However, since the decision to migrate and gain access to income sources and 
insurance can be caused by the demand side (i.e. a need by the host state for more 
employees), it is reasonable to consider situations in which a host state would desire to 
accent access to favorable foreign employment. There are countless reasons in which a 
state might desire foreign workers, such as a lack of qualified employees or a need for 
cheap labor. Under these circumstances, a nation would be willing to open up its borders 
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 Commonly, countries simply retain existing policies and institutions which are more repressive toward 
labor mobility. 
13 
 
to allow more migrant laborers and/or greater „skilled' labor. If more skilled individuals 
are allowed to enter, there are more potential workers capable of remitting. 
Countries that wish to allow more individuals to enter tend to lessen the 
restrictions on the number of migrants allowed into a state. States also “incorporate 
migrants politically into their host countries, through extension of dual citizenship,” 
(Spence, 2009, 6) or implement other migrant-friendly policies such as increasing the 
number of allotted migrants per year (Itzigsohn, 2000; Smith, 2003). These policies 
encourage and enable a greater amount of migrants into a country. Although they may 
not all be seeking employment, the larger number implies a greater overall number of 
individuals who will seek and find employment, whereby they may eventually remit 
(Appleyard, 1989). 
States can also initiate institutions directed specifically at foreign workers. In 
these instances, migrants are welcomed into a country explicitly to obtain permanent or 
temporary work, thereby increasing the number of employed migrants (Kapur and 
Singer, 2006). Similarly, some legislation is geared toward certain sectors of the 
economy. This opens up more areas of employment for foreign labor, often higher 
quality and paying occupations. If more skilled laborers enter, they are presumably 
taking higher paying jobs and consequently able to remit greater amounts of income per 
migrant (Margheritis, 2007; Smith, 2003; Ostergaard-Nielson, 2003). Under these 
circumstances, states may recognize foreign professional certification or open up access 
to a broader range of occupations. For example, Nepal allows non-tourist visas to 
individuals who work with the social and economic development works, newspapers and 
14 
 
news agencies, and international airlines organization, whereas other occupations are 
more often than not denied non-tourist visas (The Immigration Rules - 2051, Nepal 
Ministry of Home, Department of Immigration, 1994). 
 
3.2 CAPITAL MOBILITY 
Even though the fostering of migration is an influence on remittances, the two 
concepts “are not fully correlated, and although migrant streams have matured, 
remittances have not always concurrently increased” (Buch et al., 2002, 4). This is 
because host states seek to encourage immigration, but often enact barriers to the 
outflow of capital, including remittances. Taxes, tolls, and duties routinely accompany 
any exchange of capital across border, no matter the medium. Additionally, even when 
remittances are dispersed via an intermediary, “such as a bank or transfer companies like 
Western Union, they are commonly accompanied by charge fees, commissions or 
exchange margins that average between 4-10\% of most remittance payments” (Spence, 
2009, 6; Orozco, 2004). These rates become relatively excessive in large part due to the 
domestic institutions which place controls on international capital movements. While 
home country governments attempt to reduce these costs by pressuring money-senders to 
reduce their fees
8
, host nations extend institutions in order to retain as much of the 
capital within their state as possible. Presumably, host states would have little incentive 
lessen institutional restrictions on remittance outflows. 
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 This is executed by crafting bank accounts or financial services tailored toward migrants. These simplify 
and hasten the process of remitting, thereby resulting in a more inexpensive process (Levitt and de la 
Dehesa, 2002). 
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However, host states do have primary and supplementary reasons for loosening 
the barriers to remittance flows. Host governments are usually fully aware that 
aggressive and excessive restrictions on remittances will not necessarily prevent their 
outflow. Instead, migrant labor will simply resort to more surreptitious but precarious 
means
9
. Any remittance delivery method that is taken out of the hands of official 
intermediaries results in the loss of revenues from taxes and fees. Therefore, states have 
an incentive to institutionalize a reasonable medium with regards to the extent of fees or 
commissions. For example, Sierra Leone removed a ban on remittances and instead 
initiated an official act allowing for any “expatriate personnel with work permits to be 
permitted to make remittances abroad through their commercial banks, subject to such 
withholding tax obligations as are contained in the Income Tax Act 2000, if applicable” 
(The Investment Promotion Act-1, Sierra Leone, 2004). Although the act still exercises a 
tax, the government now collects an income on remittance outflows, whereas before it 
had passed up this revenue generation opportunity. Policies of this sort, although 
relatively rare, are directed specifically at remittances, and thus have a sizeable and 
significant impact on the capability of migrant workers to remit. 
From a secondary perspective, host states often seek to encourage free movement 
of capital in order to foster trade and economic prosperity. Enacting policies which 
reduce barriers to capital flows, whether they are directed at FDI, PI, or remittances, 
undoubtedly result in increases in financial flows across borders. Although states 
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 Examples would include direct mail, the black market, or physical delivery in person (Aggarawal et al., 
2006). In each of these cases a remitter runs a higher risk of none of the money being delivered at all, but 
increases their chances of avoiding royalty payments on international exchanges. 
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commonly establish institutions guiding the free exchange of capital in order to foster 
investments (FDI or PI), it has the ancillary effect of allowing remitters to send capital 
with fewer restrictions such as taxes, tolls, or tariffs. Even though this logic is similar to 
states institutionalizing initiatives related to reducing fees and commissions on 
remittances, it differs because policies of this type are broadly related to free movement 
of capital and rarely directed specifically on remittances or intermediaries such as 
transfer companies. Rather, knowledgeable remitters can take advantage of wide-ranging 
capital exchange institutions and policy directed indistinctly at remittance flows. 
Correspondingly, every state in the world abides by some sort of exchange rate 
regime. Whether it is a freely floating or tightly managed, each state institutionalizes its 
exchange rate. Like capital and investment agreements, this is usually not directly 
intended to affect remittance flows. However, the inherent volatility or stability of 
varying types of exchange rate regimes is a deterrent or enticement for remitters (Buch 
et al., 2002; Orozco, 2004; Rivera, 2005; Spence, 2009; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004). 
Although migrant laborers are usually concerned with the specific exchange rate, they 
also judge the potential volatility of the exchange rate. Independently floating rates are 
intrinsically capricious because sectoral interests, interest groups, and voters can 
pressure politicians and monetary officials into altering the exchange rate (Bernhard and 
Leblang, 1999; Keefer and Stasavage, 2002). This implies that remitters are less 
confident in the value of their remittances as they are sent home. On the other hand, 
more stable rates, such as pegged, induce confidence in investors and remitters alike. 
This confidence stems from the assumption that the value of a remitters income will not 
17 
 
be grossly and potentially negatively affected as it is exchanged across countries over 
time. This means migrant workers will be more inclined to remit legally (i.e. through 
official intermediaries) when exchange rate regimes are more stable. 
Host states have motives to both restrict and promote remittance flows via capital 
mobility. Further, these desires are not always in congruence with incentives to limit or 
foster labor mobility, and are not always done with the explicit intent of directly 
affecting remittances. Nonetheless, capital mobility institutions are established by host 
governments and they have significant impacts on the ability and capacity of migrant 
workers to remit. 
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4. SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 
When an individual seeks employment in a foreign land while supporting a 
family which remained in the home state, the initial need for remittances has developed 
(Stark et al., 1986; Buch et al., 2002). As seen in Figure 2, there are two general „push' 
and „pull' mechanisms which affect the circumstances in which an individual seeks 
foreign employment and the amount they are willing to remit. 
 
Figure 2 
Supply and Demand Dynamics between Home and Host Nations 
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4.1 SUPPLY 
Instances in which a home state becomes downtrodden (socially, politically, or 
economically) force individuals to seek a better living in another country (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 2001; Kapur and Singer, 2006). Often the individuals will be unable or 
unwilling to bring their family members to the new state. This is a supply (push) 
occurrence because the individual is basically being forced out of his/her country in 
order to search for employment. A situation of an abundance supply of labor in the 
region has developed because a home state is producing numerous individuals who are 
seeking optimal employment. 
Similarly, when migrant workers have attained employment for whatever reason 
in a foreign nation, they may become flush with more income under favorable 
circumstances (i.e. improvement in the economy, better employment, lower taxes due to 
change in the government) (Woodward, 2007). Given this situation, the migrant, who is 
still supporting a family in the host nation, will have more disposable income in which 
they can send back home. In this instance, the individual's growth in earnings has led to 
a larger supply of capital in which to remit. 
 
4.2 DEMAND 
Alternatively, there are also instances in which nations demand (pull) foreign 
labor and capital. Regions where individuals can feasibly migrate are often socially, 
economically, and politically divergent. This is not to imply that any single country is 
substandard, but rather that there is often a country within a region that overwhelmingly 
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appeals to individuals as a destination of choice. Even when an individual maintains a 
comfortable living in his/her home nation, they may still be drawn to the nation 
epitomized as superior. In these instances, if individuals decide to migrate to the host 
nation due to its assumed superiority (whether it be economic, social, or political) they 
are pulled in by the lure of a „better life' (Kapur, 2005; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004). 
Likewise, this country may demand foreign labor during times in which its labor supply 
is less than desired (either in numbers or quality). 
Correspondingly, when migrant workers have already become employed in a 
host state, situations in their home nation may force them to make sacrifices which result 
in remitting more earnings. For instance, if a home state is suddenly plunged into a 
recession or political chaos, the security of any job in the home state is in jeopardy. 
Therefore, migrants abroad will feel pressure to send even more money home to ensure 
the security of their family (Spence, 2009). This instance can be viewed as a situation of 
the home family demanding more money from their kin abroad in order to guarantee 
financial stability. 
In many instances the same factors simultaneously affect both the supply and 
demand mechanisms (Biglaiser and DeRouen, n.d.). This is why it is important to not 
only evaluate the social, political, and economic conditions of a host state, but also to 
assess these same conditions within home states and the region as a whole. The primary 
factors are internal conflict, economic growth, income, population, unemployment, trade 
openness, inflation, polity, regime stability, and corruption. 
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As seen, there are numerous contextual variables (both regional and domestic) 
which relate to the need of immigrants to seek employment in foreign countries, the 
ability of a host nation to offer optimal employment opportunities, and the necessitation 
of families to receive remittances. The relative openness of a state to both labor and 
capital flows is irrelevant if there are minimal desires of foreign individuals to seek 
employment in a host nation and/or if a host nation has a minimal need for (foreign) 
employment. However, given that there are supply and demand remittance mechanisms 
at work, domestic institutions have a significant impact on the ability of individuals to 
migrate and subsequently remit. 
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Though it is important and relevant to understand what factors lead states to 
design and establish institutions related to labor and capital mobility, the goal of this 
article is to identify the effects of these institutions on remittance flows. Developing and 
developed nations introduce institutions for countless reasons. As noted, states may 
intentionally be attempting to manage remittance flows, or they may design institutions 
which inadvertently affect remittances. Across regions, states, and time the outcomes of 
each of these institutions will vary. This paper sets out to evaluate the intended and 
unintended consequences of capital and labor mobility institutions while considering 
contextual regional influences and controlling for domestic factors, both of which 
restrict or promote labor and capital flows. 
 
5.1 SAMPLE 
The data-set consists of time-series cross-sectional (TSCS or pooled) data for 
approximately 104 nations over 15 years (1990-2004). Data limitations, both across 
space and time, prevent the expansion of the study. However, the sample still garners 
upwards of 1170 observations (with the smallest amount of observations for a model 
being roughly 901 observations)
10
. Further, this reduced sample size allows for relatively 
consistent sample sizes across each of the models. The source and a more detailed 
                                                 
10
 Due to variation in the statistical approaches of each model, some of the results have a different number 
of nations included in the sample. However, the primary analysis possesses 104 nations with the variations 
in number of countries occurring within the alternative models. 
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operationalization for each of the variables comprising the data can be located in 
appendix. 
Additionally, the sample and analysis has been restricted to the outflow of 
remittances. This is because efforts to control inflows from the domestic perspective of 
the home state are rendered relatively meaningless if host states severely restrict 
immigration inflow and remittance outflow
11
. Because remittances are generated initially 
in the host state, it is logical to determine and analyze the designed factors (institutions) 
which inhibit or endorse remittance production within it source before moving to 
designed influences within the home state. 
 
5.2 VARIABLES 
5.2.1 Regionalization 
The next few sections describe the dependent and independent variables, while 
also presenting theories and explicitly or implicitly offering hypotheses. Of relevance is 
that many of the independent contextual variables are also individually averaged across a 
region and subsequently differenced with the host state value for the variable
12
. The 
desire to average and difference single measures of variables is derived from the non-
dyadic nature of the dependent variable and the supply & demand influence of 
contextual factors on remittances. Obviously domestic factors (i.e. institutions, 
economic, social, and political conditions) play an important role in determining the 
                                                 
11
 Understandably, even stringent host practices and institutions designed to limit remittances are not 
capable of fully eliminating remittance outflows. But they will pose as a serious impediment to remittance 
exchange. 
12
 The domestic (host state) value minus regional average. 
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outflow of remittances from a host state. But, as theorized above, push and pull factors 
that drive remittance outflows also originate from home states (receiving nations). Many 
scholars quantitatively studying large-N samples of remittance flows routinely neglect 
this consideration (Rivera, 2005; Spence, 2009; Buch et al., 2002; Buch and Kuckulenz, 
2004), and sometimes even assume to know, and subsequently model, explicitly where 
remittances are being paid (i.e. the specific nation of destination) (Spence, 2009). 
However, because the dependent variable is non-dyadic, it is impossible to 
determine exactly what states remittances originate (when operationalized as receiving) 
or their nation of destination (when operationalized as paid). Therefore, to account for 
the supply and demand dynamics of home states on the outflow (payment) of 
remittances, the need to average regional factors exist. Further, it avoids the theoretical 
problem of assuming, and consequently measuring, what specific states receive 
payments remittances. Any incorporation of singular home state dynamics intended to 
express home state push and pull mechanisms is theoretically and statistically erroneous 
because we do not know explicitly what percentage of remittance outflows that the home 
state is actually being paid. On the other hand, regional averages capture the supply and 
demand logic on a generalized scale in congruence with the comprehensive and 
indiscriminate origin and destination of measured remittance flows. 
I first theorize that a majority of remittances are generated by migrant labor from 
relevant, contiguous, and International Labor Organization (ILO) nations. This 
comprehensive measure is intended to capture a wide-ranging group of potentially 
pertinent nations. As noted, it is comprised of three different regional groupings. The 
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first consortium is garnered from relevant regional nations, which consist of grouping 
developed and by obtained from Gleditsch and Ward (2001)
13
. This assembly is intended 
to capture home countries within the same geographic region as the host state no matter 
how distant they may be. 
The second combination is comprised of contiguous nations. Using EUGene 
(Bennett and Stam, 2000), I coded contiguous nations as bordering the host state or 
separated by no more than 150 miles of water. This grouping is expected to capture only 
home nations in which it is feasible to migrate to and remit from a host state on 
relatively limited budget or short amount of time. Including solely contiguous states also 
eliminates the inclusion of nations which might be part of the relevant region but can 
easily be determined to not have a significant impact or international relationship with 
the host state. Additionally, this allows for the inclusion of nations which may be 
contiguous to the host state but are not considered part of the relevant region. 
Lastly, I include a measure of ILO nations. The ILO offers a cursory dataset of 
the primary national sources of migrants and migrant labor for numerous host states. In 
virtually all the cases, geographically contingent and approximate states were the largest 
suppliers of labor. However, in some cases (i.e. the U.S.), dominant sources were not 
exclusive to regional or contingent neighbors. The ILO collection captures the countries 
which are specifically measured to have provided the most immigrants to the host state 
(and presumably are the primary sources of remittance outflows), and therefore 
                                                 
13
 The nations comprising the relevant regional model consist of: 1. Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union; 
2. Latin America; 3. North Africa \& the Middle East; 4. Sub-Saharan Africa; 5. Western Europe and 
North America; 6. East Asia; 7. South-East Asia; 8. South Asia; 9. The Pacific; and 10. The Caribbean 
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eliminates the possible inclusion of home states which are insignificant with regards to 
providing immigrants. However, the downside of the grouping is it commonly only 
provides data on a short lists of immigrant source nations. It likely misses out on some 
pertinent home nations. 
Due to the advantages and shortcomings of these four regional combinations, 
they are each individually analyzed and presented. But, first they must go through one 
more crucial process. Although regional averages are an important factor influencing 
remittance outflows. I am more generally concerned with differences between home and 
host state contextual factors. As theorized above, supply and demand mechanisms are 
often related not simply to the absolute level of home factors, but rather the difference 
between home and host factors. Migrants can be drawn to host states with more 
successful social, political, and economic factors even when their home state is 
sufficient. This is because the host state is viewed as significantly more prosperous due 
to its higher contextual factors. Alternatively, growing differences in contextual factors 
between a home and host state implies either a greater need for employed migrant 
laborers to remit back home due to deteriorating home state conditions or a greater 
capacity to remit more money due to a growth in host state conditions (which 
presumably increase the earning power of a migrant worker). 
Further, differentiating depicts an initial desire to migrate or remit. Differences 
between home and host states that lead to superior conditions in the home state are 
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representative of a lack of desire by an individual to aspire to migrate and/or remit
14
. 
Given these circumstances, I would not expect an individual to seek foreign employment 
or send earnings to a family in a home state. Modeling solely the regional averages of 
home states does not represent the divergence of conditions between home and host. For 
example, it is difficult to determine if an individual would seek foreign employment if I 
only knew of the home state conditions. I could not assess an individual's motivation to 
migrate if I didn't know if the destination (host state) had superior economic, social, or 
political environment. Therefore, given the previously described need to average 
regional contextual factors, there also exist a necessity to difference the regional 
averages and the domestic values. 
5.2.2 Dependent 
The dependent variable is the annual net outflow (payment) of real remittances 
for a country from 1990-2004. Net outflow is defined as the paid remittances and 
compensation of employees. Remittances and compensation is comprised of current 
transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers 
(World Bank, 2006). Data are taken from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (2006). The primary model possesses 104 countries across all levels of 
economic development and regions of the world. Understandably, available data tends to 
consist of more developed nations. However, the focus on more recent years allows for 
the inclusion of greater variation in the countries and relatively balanced models. 
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 If an individual is currently working abroad, optimal conditions in a home imply that the migrant is now 
and insurer rather than provider (Buch et al., 2002). The migrant will only begin to remit again if the 
conditions in the home state deteriorate or if the conditions in the host state improve significantly. 
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Table 1 
Variable Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Remittance Outflow 1794 6.782 34.734 -212.000 360.000 
Freedom of Movement 3033 0.576 1.764 0.000 26.000 
Migrant Workers 3033 1.467 5.143 0.000 32.000 
PT Labor Migration 3033 1.020 4.012 0.000 28.000 
Ex. Rate Type 2654 7.223 4.214 1.000 13.000 
Remittance 3033 0.203 0.995 0.000 11.000 
FM Capital 2145 10.127 5.688 0.000 23.000 
Labor 3033 2.334 1.111 0.000 3.000 
Capital 3017 1.973 0.731 0.000 3.000 
Immigration 1503 10.704 2.367 3.401 16.870 
Internal Conflict 2548 0.321 0.796 0.000 3.000 
Population 2830 8.419 2.187 2.221 14.061 
Corruption 1637 40.231 27.171 0.000 100.000 
Unemployment 1579 9.218 5.887 0.300 43.500 
GDP Growth 2803 144.979 532.987 -6054.560 5980.120 
Income 2803 8377.115 8583.287 170.550 50759.560 
Trade Openness 1963 83.814 52.922 2.004 462.926 
Inflation 2603 73.338 695.124 -24.100 26800.000 
Polity 2323 2.499 6.851 -10.000 10.000 
Regime Stability 2366 22.046 29.642 0.000 195.000 
Internal Conflict
a
 2927 0.028 0.705 -2.889 1.333 
Corruption
a
 2181 8.986 25.549 -54.722 79.524 
Unemployment
a
 1488 0.746 5.485 -24.033 30.900 
Economic Growth
a
 2803 -0.232 488.184 -5792.366 6071.505 
Income
a
 2830 -108.553 5367.195 -24653.240 11522.020 
Trade Openness
a
 2747 26.032 60.519 -302.493 160.433 
Inflation
a
 2711 -3.898 656.289 -26274.820 1247.617 
Polity
a
 2927 2.665 7.262 -14.825 30.121 
Regime Stability
a
 2927 4.253 23.327 -92.944 63.056 
a
 signifies the variable is regionally averaged and then differenced from the domestic value 
(regionalization consist of the aggregate coding structure) 
 
 
5.2.3 Independent 
Extant literature has contended numerous sources of influence on the flows of 
remittances. This includes macro- and microeconomic influences, as well as political and 
societal causes. However, it has largely neglected to consider and analyze the influence 
of domestic institutions. Below I review many of the more prominent, but also under-
evaluated, causes of remittance outflows. I present theoretical reasoning and hypotheses 
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for the primary independent variables (institutional mechanisms), while also providing 
cursory expectations for the direction of the expected effects of the contextual variables. 
Table 1 provides a brief statistical account of the characteristics of the variables, 
including the dependent variable. 
 Institutions. For this study, institutional based variables are inherently a 
domestic product. Host states design and implement them in order to manipulate and 
manage either labor or capital mobility across their borders. They are not directly related 
to the push and pull mechanisms discussed earlier. Rather, they are the inhibiters of the 
supply and demand logic. They are organized and used to either promote or diminish the 
outflow of remittances via labor and capital mobility. Therefore, unlike many of the 
contextual variables (domestic conditions and regional environment) to be discussed 
later, they are only modeled as they relate to the host state. They are not averaged or 
differenced in congruence with regional influences. 
Domestic institutions are regularly a state's primary mechanism by which to 
monitor and control the outflow of remittances. Given that remittances are affected by 
both the ability of migrants to enter into a country and the capability of them to 
subsequently send money back out of a state, a host nation can impinge on remittance 
flows by either addressing labor or capital mobility. 
Labor Mobility. Prominent policies instruments of institutions designed to 
manage labor mobility are those related to the freedom of movement of all persons 
across borders, the control of migrant workers occupations, and the extent by which 
migrant laborers can gain and retain actual employment. 
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The ability to control overall immigrant mobility greatly affects remittance flows. 
Even though not all migrants intend to attain employment, larger numbers of admitted 
migrants implies larger numbers of potential workers
15
. Consequently, the greater the 
number of potential workers from a pool of migrants, the greater the amount of 
remittances. States often initially have restrictive policies toward migrants. However, 
they may be coerced domestically or internationally to introduce policies that allow for 
the loosening of restrictions on migrants. Therefore: 
 
H1: As the number of institutional policies intended to reduce the limits on immigration 
(Freedom of Movement) increases, the amount of remittance outflows from a host state 
will increase. 
 
Although national governments introduce legislation controlling the broad 
movement of people, they are also concerned with the actual employment of the 
individuals when they enter a nation. Host governments are critical of allowing 
excessive amounts of individuals to enter a nation and gain employment. Migrant 
laborers occupy domestic jobs usually viewed as substandard or blue collar (i.e. 
construction, farming, transportation). This can result in backlash by native citizens who 
feel their jobs are being taken by foreigners. However, especially in developed nations, 
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 These workers may be legally employed when there are few restrictions against it but they may also be 
illegally employed. In either case, they will still often remit through intermediaries (Buch and Kuckulenz, 
2004). 
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there are labor shortages due to a decrease in population growth
16
 (Hass, 2008). Under 
this circumstance, governments are inclined to introduce institutional legislation 
allowing for temporary or permanent work permits. The broad number of lower-level 
occupations needed to be filled, along with the temporary nature of many of the 
occupations (i.e. seasonal farming and construction projects which no longer require 
labor once the project is completed) implies that the government introduces relatively 
vague permits allowing individuals to move between sectors. Therefore, I hypothesize 
that: 
 
H2: As the number of institutional policies directed at reducing the restrictions on 
temporary and permanent employment (PT Labor Migration) increases, the amount of 
remittance outflows from a host state will increase. 
 
Lastly, there are circumstances in which migrants are explicitly banned from 
certain sectors (i.e. military, government). But, more often states institutionalize policies 
that allow workers to garner work visas (of varying types) when they work in specific 
fields (i.e. energy, management, media, medical, education). Though these policies are 
similar to allowing workers to gain temporary or permanent work visas, it differs 
considerably because these policies are aimed directly at certain sectors. More common 
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 Though more common in higher income nations, poorer or developing countries often feel the strain of a 
lack of employable persons. This can be the result of internal strife, conflict, or simply a growth of the 
economy that outpaces the growth in population (Hass, 2008). 
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in developing nations
17
, governments desire for more experienced and knowledgeable 
workers to enter a country in order to stabilize the economic infrastructure and facilitate 
the economic growth. The foreign workers share their expertise and promote desired 
growth through their more efficient means of development. Thus: 
 
H3: As the number of institutional policies aimed at reducing the constraints on specific 
areas of employment (Migrant Workers) increases, the amount of remittance outflows 
from a host state will increase. 
 
Capital Mobility. Even when a host state desires labor, it may simultaneously 
want to restrict the outflow of capital. Nations would rather see capital reinvested into 
the domestic economy. However, the ability to garner profits from international capital 
exchange (via taxes, tolls, and commissions), as well as escalating aspiration to 
globalize, implies that states are willing to open up their economies and allow for the 
relatively free exchange of capital across borders. The mechanisms intended to loosen 
the restrictions on international capital mobility have direct and indirect impacts on 
remittances. 
The primary policies devices of institutions designed to manage capital mobility 
are those related to the explicit legislation addressing remittance flows, the establishment 
of exchange rate regimes, and agreements allowing for the free movement of capital. 
                                                 
17
 Although it is more common in developing nations, higher income nations also find themselves opening 
up to specific types of foreign labor. Circumstances arise in which a state becomes globalized to the point 
that they are required to admit specific types of skilled labor because these individuals already are 
ingrained in their economy (Hass, 2008). 
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As with the labor mobility institutions, national governments can introduce 
policies which are explicitly intended to address the flow of capital between nations in 
the form of remittances. Initiating policy directed at allowing the outflow of remittances 
enables governments to tax these capital movements. Complete banishment of 
remittances flows means the government loses out on this revenue source. Yet, this 
generally does not stop the flow of remittance, but instead drives remittances 
underground where they escape the stringent restrictions on their movements
18
. This 
does not imply that nations are willing to fully and cheaply allow the flow of remittances 
out of their state. When governments believe that there are significant amounts of 
remittances crossing their border, they still have an incentive to introduce some sort of 
institutional policy aimed at collecting profits from the movement of remittances. 
Therefore, states concerned with remittance flows will usually enact some institutional 
policy that reduces restrictions on remittance flows but does not entirely abolish all 
limitations on remittance flows. I hypothesize: 
 
H4: As the number of institutional policies intended to diminish the monitoring, 
controlling, or tolling of remittance flows (Remittance) increases, the amount of 
remittance outflows from a host state will increase. 
 
Enacting policies geared specifically to monitor remittances is an example of a 
direct way in which national governments control remittance flows. However, other less 
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 The covert nature of these types of remittance flows implies that they are difficult to measure and 
therefore complicated to evaluate accurately. 
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direct mechanisms have equally influential impacts on the outflow of remittances from 
host states. 
Nearly every national government abides by some form of exchange rate regime. 
They range from free floating to tightly pegged to another economy. Regularly the 
establishment of the regime is intended to promote monetary and fiscal stability, 
development, and to open an economy up to investments via FDI and PI. However, 
remitters are acutely aware of exchange rates since the transfer of salaries across borders 
is directly affected by the rate (Lianos, 1997; Russell, 1986). Given their concern for the 
exchange rate, most remitters avoid remitting excessively when exchange rates are 
floating. This is because floating exchange rates are allowed to vary against that of other 
currencies and are determined by the market forces, as well as sectoral interests. 
Although these rates are usually manage to the extent of preventing extreme inflation or 
deflation, they still change almost constantly. This ambiguous and steady alteration 
implies that remitters are unaware of exactly the value of their remittances once they 
leave the host state. Alternatively, migrant labor tends to prefer the stability 
accompanied by tightly managed (pegged or fixed) rates because they have (nearly) 
direct convertibility to another currency (presumably of the home state). Therefore: 
 
H5: More loosely managed de facto exchange rate regimes (Ex. Rate Regime) will lower 
the amount of remittance outflows from a host state. 
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States also indirectly influence remittance flows by enacting policies which 
encourage the free movement of capital. Frequently, the initiative to open up capital 
exchange by universally reducing restrictions on capital movement is done with the 
intent of promoting trade and investment in the form of FDI and PI. Commonly 
international investment agreements, such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 
establish reciprocal protocols regulating the exchange of capital between two nations 
(Chowla, 2005). 
These policies are often so broad (such that they apply to all forms of capital 
exchange no matter the area of investment) that migrant labor can take equal advantage 
of them. Reductions in taxes, commissions, and tolls on broad capital exchange provide 
informed migrant workers with ability to move remittances more inexpensively. Further, 
these institutional policies are directed at banks rather than financial intermediaries. The 
reduction on international exchange costs within banks and large financial 
conglomerates means migrant laborers are more willing to use them as mediums for 
remitting. This increase in incentives to invest in banks implies that remitters can earn 
interest on their earnings before remitting them. Therefore: 
 
H6: As policies on the free movement of capital are expanded (by entering into more 
BITs) (FM Capital), it will increase the outflow of remittances from a host state. 
 
Interaction. As seen above, states may have a vested interest in introducing 
institutional policies, relating to international labor and capital mobility that are 
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contradictory to each other. Some national governments wish to increase labor inflows in 
order to alleviate manpower shortages or introduce skilled labor. However, at the same 
time, they may desire to restrict the outflow of capital in an effort to force individuals to 
invest domestically. Alternatively, some states do not lack labor and therefore maintain 
relatively closed borders. Yet, they are interested in global exchange of capital in order 
to promote foreign investment and globalize economically. 
Given scenarios like these, states are simultaneously establishing institutions 
which both restrict and promote factors that lead to remittance outflows. Therefore, it is 
necessary to evaluate the interactive effects (Labor*Capital) of both labor and capital 
mobility institutions. 
 
H7: Institutional labor barriers will reduce the outflow of remittance if and only if the 
level of institutional capital barriers is sufficiently high. 
 
H8: Institutional capital barriers will reduce the outflow of remittance if and only if the 
level of institutional labor barriers is sufficiently high. 
 
Economic Contextual Variables. Prior literature has been relatively thorough in 
its evaluation of the large-N economic and macroeconomic influences of remittances 
(Rivera, 2005; Lianos, 1997; Perez-Lopez and Diaz-Briquets, 1993; Russell, 1986; 
Huggins and Hicks, 2009; Buch et al., 2002; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004; Lianos, 1997). 
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The predominant variables used have been economic growth, income, unemployment, 
trade openness, and inflation. 
Economic growth (GDP Growth) is a proxy for the economic strength of an 
economy. As an economy becomes stronger and more established, its citizens and 
workers should feel the repercussions in the forms of higher wages. This implies that 
employed migrant workers can remit larger amounts due to higher earnings. Similarly, 
gains in the economy act as a pull mechanism by attracting foreign labor to more 
prosperous regions. These laborers may then potentially remit in the future. 
Income, as measured by GDP per Capita, is often cited as one of the primary 
reasons for remittance flows. It elucidates the desire for foreign workers to migrate to 
another country. They can seek better-quality jobs which often pay more. As a result, 
workers have the ability to send even more money back to their home nation. I expect 
that the models will show that as income increases, the amount of remittances paid will 
increase. 
From a pull perspective, high Unemployment in a host state is a signal to 
potential migrants that there is little work to be found. If an individual has already 
migrated and currently resides in a host state, high unemployment may entail a lack of 
available jobs. It also may force the migrant to be willing to settle for substandard 
occupation simply to garner some minimal wage. From this perspective, unemployment, 
as measured solely in the host state, implies a decrease in remittances. 
Higher levels of Trade Openness imply that a nation has become more 
globalized, and is successfully developing economically. Domestic companies are 
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creating abundant employment opportunities in the host country which can be filled by 
not only domestic labor but also by foreign labor. Foreign workers are attracted to this 
economically flourishing region, and domestic employees reap the benefits of a 
successful trade industry. Additionally, increases in overall foreign trade tend to be 
accompanied by increases in international interactions. These interactions promote a 
state internationally and attract foreign labor which views the state as productively 
growing, thereby increasing their desire to migrate to the host state.  Therefore, as trade 
openness increases, I hypothesize that outflows of remittances will increase. 
Higher Inflation is considered to be a detriment. This means that higher levels of 
inflation in host states are not attractive to foreigners and do not allow migrant labor to 
remit more. Higher inflation rates imply a loss of purchasing power. This would detract 
individuals from desiring to travel to a nation where they income they earn would be less 
valuable. Further, migrants residing in the host nation would be forced to work and earn 
more in order to be able to afford to make a suitable living. This becomes even more 
problematic when it is considered that many of the individuals seeking foreign 
employment initially started with meager amounts of capital. They cannot manage to pay 
more for goods and services that they could barely afford to begin with. Therefore, I 
expect that as domestic inflation increases, remittance outflow will decrease. 
Variable Differentiation. Each of the variables above, with the exceptions of 
unemployment and inflation, identify factors which when increased in a host state, not 
only offer a pull factor that attracts foreign labor, but also a push factor that provides 
migrant labor with more money to remit. Unemployment and inflation work in the 
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opposite direction, whereby increases are hypothesized to result in decrease of 
remittances. 
However, as stated, each of these variables is only capturing half the picture. 
They miss the effect of migrants being pushed from their home state, due to diminishing 
economic conditions, and subsequently seeking more rewarding economic areas. They 
also overlook the demand considerations of a home nation, whereby once again 
weakening economic conditions create a greater incentive by migrant workers to remit 
more money in order to alleviate the deteriorating home economy. From this logic, I 
expect that when the regional variables related to GDP growth, income, and trade 
openness increase (implying that the conditions between the host and home (regional) 
states are more severe), there will be an increase in remittance outflows. Conversely, 
when there are increases in unemployment or inflation, migrants will feel less of a need 
to seek foreign employment and fewer immigrants will be less capable of remitting 
earnings. They will either be unable to find employment or will have to spend more 
income on basic goods and services, and not on remittances. 
These differentiated measures do not perfectly capture the alterations in the 
conditions of home states. But, they do represent the divergence in conditions between 
home and host which would put pressure on a migrant to seek foreign employment and 
remit more earnings. 
Political Contextual Variables. The assessment of political variables on 
remittance flows has been largely deficient. Few studies have actively attempted to 
evaluate the influence of these variables (Biglaiser and DeRouen, n.d.; Kapur and 
40 
 
Singer, 2006; Spence, 2009). However, this does not entail that their effects should be 
discounted. Specifically, I will address the variables polity and regime stability. Polity, 
operationalized as a 21-point scale (-10 being least democratic and 10 being the most) is 
expected to have a positive effect on outflows of remittances. This is because as nations 
become more democratic, their institutions are more transparent and they are less likely 
to illegally seize any form of capital gains. Individuals in highly democratic nations will 
not have a need to conceal their income and dispatch it discretely. Similarly, migrant 
labor desire to migrate to countries where they do not have to fear repressive political 
regimes which act outside of the will of the people. Further, democracies tend to be more 
politically open to the rights of all people, including migrants. This allows migrants the 
possibility of influencing political agendas in beneficial ways. 
The Regime Stability, or length of time a regime has lasted in a nation, is 
expected to increase remittance outflows from host countries. Migrant workers in host 
nations become familiarized with the government's practices and may have the desire to 
send their monies to home markets because they are confident that a sudden 
displacement of the government is unlikely. Further, they have become accustomed to 
the generally steady legal proceedings associated with a stable regime, and do expect 
these to change excessively or immediately. Unstable governments imply that 
individuals would accumulate and save money for fear of needing it in the future. These 
saving would lessen the impact of abrupt political change and insure against any 
political, social, or economic repercussions of unexpected political change, but would 
not be able to be remitted. 
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Variable Differentiation. Once again, the political variables described above 
represent both host nation effects on remittance and home (regional) influences. 
Hypothetically, as a home state becomes more democratic relative to a host state (the 
difference between the two decreases), there is less of a need to remit or to leave the 
home state in search of a more promising and politically open nation. If individuals in 
home states are less fearful that their government will illegally expropriate incomes and 
private property, they will become less dependent on remittances and will be less willing 
to leave the decreasingly politically repressive state. 
Similarly, as a home state's government becomes more stable (regardless of its 
level of polity), individuals are more confident in what to expect from the political 
regime. They are accustomed to the political environment and therefore know how to 
appropriately adapt. This creates less of a need to burden the costs of searching for 
foreign employment. Additionally, if a more economically prosperous area is 
experiencing significant regime alterations, individuals may be fearful to migrate 
because they are uncertain of the ultimate outcome of the regime change and instead 
choose to stay in the relatively stable home state. Even when a home state is politically 
stable, there may also still exist a need for remittance in the home state because the 
current regime may treat property rights and incomes unfavorably. However, extensive 
experience with such despotism implies that individuals are more accustomed with these 
repressive tactics than individuals under similar but less stable regimes. Therefore, 
individuals under more stable regimes will be less reliant on the extra income associated 
with remittances. 
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Social Contextual Variables. These variables are intended to address domestic 
societal factors beyond politics and economics which might influence the outflow of 
remittances. Specifically, I will model the effects of internal conflict, corruption, 
population, and immigration. Internal conflict, corruption, and population are 
hypothesized to have negative impacts on remittance outflows, while immigration 
positively affects remittance outflows. 
Increases in Internal Conflict are expected to decrease outflows of remittances 
from host states because migrants in these areas must conserve their earnings in order to 
insure against the possibility of costly destruction and violence. Further, internal conflict 
tends to slow the domestic economy. People become fearful of the violence and remain 
at home to avoid being caught in the middle. Therefore, it is tougher on individuals to 
remit because they may be avoiding work and not earning a wage, or may be 
safeguarding their earnings in order to protect against any potential negative effect of the 
conflict. Because of the violence and destruction, individuals will similarly avoid 
migrating to host states experience high levels of internal conflict. 
Corruption is expected to be a deterrent to outflows of remittances. Greater 
levels of corruption in host states imply that migrants would avoid these illicit 
environments because it is more likely they will be treated fraudulently. They are not 
assured of earning fair wages (i.e. above minimum wage) or that their incomes will be 
expropriated illegally. Similarly, migrant workers already residing in corrupt nations are 
likely dealing with these issues. Thus, they are unable to send significant amounts of 
their earnings because much of their wages are garnered illicitly or they are paid well 
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below a fair wage. Alternatively, less corrupt host states attract migrants because 
individuals are not fearful of being taken advantage, and promote remittance outflows 
because they are able to garner legitimate wages. 
High Population levels of host states signal to foreign workers that there are 
extensive amounts of competition for employment. This is problematic because it makes 
finding and retaining a job more difficult. Therefore, individuals would be less willing to 
migrate to highly populated areas and contend with the competition for employment. 
Correspondingly, migrant labor existing in a highly populated can be more easily 
displaced from their job because there are more people competing for their job. Further, 
in the event of a layoff, it is more difficult for the migrant to find work. Each of these 
problems entails a situation whereby it is more difficult for a migrant laborer to remit 
because it is more likely that they will become unemployed or unable to find a job. 
The importance of actual underline{Immigration must be addressed and 
controlled for even though the host state pull dynamics are not entirely applicable
19
, nor 
are the home state pull or push mechanisms
20
. This variable has been incorporated by 
other authors (Rivera, 2005) and theoretical implications considered by other researchers 
(Appleyard, 1989; Wucker, 2004; Kapur and Singer, 2006; Funkhouser, 1995; Buch et 
al., 2002; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004). The general sentiment is that as immigration 
                                                 
19
 Increases in immigration levels likely do not attract foreign workers to a host state. However, it is 
possible that foreign labor may 'follow the herd' to areas in which other migrants are moving (Appleyard, 
1989). 
20
 Employed foreign labor is not theorized to be influenced by the inflow of migrants into their home state. 
Greater amounts of migration into the home state do not induce migrant labor to send greater amount of 
remittances home or to seek employment in a host state. If there is a significant migration into a home 
state, it is likely because economic conditions are optimal or because the surrounding areas are 
experiencing significant economic, political, or societal problems. 
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increases, the outflow of remittances will increase. Understandably, as more immigrants 
migrate to a foreign land the amount of remittances paid to home nations will increase 
because there are simply more workers sending money home. 
Variable Differentiation. Unlike the previous contextual factors, I have not 
included each of the variables. Excluded are immigration and population because they 
are included primarily as control variables. However, internal conflict and corruption are 
still averaged across the region and differenced. 
With regards to regional conflicts, positive increases in the differences between 
host and home states imply that either the host state has become more conflicting or the 
home state has become more peaceful. If the home state has become more peaceful, 
there is less of a need to remit into it and less of a desire to leave it, especially into a 
conflicting host state. If the host state has increased internal violence, individuals will 
not be drawn toward it and they will be less able to remit from it (the theoretical 
dynamics associated with domestic influences). Therefore, in either situation remittances 
are expected to decrease as the differences between host and home state increase. 
If a home state is less corrupt relative to a host state, individuals are unlikely to 
be pushed from it. They are not pressured to locate to a more advantageous social 
environment where they can be assured of attaining their rightful earnings, especially if 
potential host states are drastically more corrupt. Similarly, if the host state is more 
corrupt than the home state, there is not the pressure to remit large amounts of money 
because the family at home is not being deprived of fair wages or stripped unjustly of 
earnings. In addition, it is likely immigrants in the corrupt host state have their earnings 
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illegally garnished, and thereby cannot remit as much as desired or back home. Thus, I 
expect that as host states become increasingly corrupt relative to home nations, 
remittance outflows will decrease. 
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6. METHOD 
 
To investigate the effects of variations in institutional promotions/barriers on 
remittance outflows, I employ time series and cross sectional (pooled) data ranging from 
1990-2004. Not only does this increase the size of the sample (N) but it allows me to 
explore the macro-level determinants of variation across both space and time. However, 
because the data has approximately 15 time periods for each nation, time series 
properties must be considered. Non-stationarity, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and 
serial correlation are inherent pitfalls in pooled data, as well as the possibility of varying 
coefficients (over both intercepts and slopes). 
The inclusion of numerous nations over a relatively long period of time implies 
the possibility of variations in intercepts and slopes across nations and time. Modifying 
the data and running a Hausman specification test indicated that statistically significant 
variation existed across intercepts but not the slopes, and that a fixed effect model was 
superior to a random effects model. Further, a quick glance at Figure 1 depicts the likely 
existence of non-stationarity. Because the data are unbalanced, an xtfisher test (Maddala 
and Wu, 1999) is appropriate for testing for the presence of non-stationarity. The test 
confirmed its existence. To address these issues, it is recommended to use a first 
difference transformation of the dependent variable and find a suitable instrument to 
apply to the model (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) recommend 
introducing yt-2 as an instrument on the right-hand side instead of Δyt-1. 
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Additionally, I tested for the presence of cross unit correlation, panel 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation across the disturbances.  A Breusch-Pagan 
statistic for cross-sectional independence (Greene, 2000) signified the presence of panel 
correlation and a modified Wald test depicted the existence of panel heteroskedasticity 
(Greene, 2000). An xtserial test (Drukker, 2003) showed that autocorrelation was a 
problem and a likelihood ratio test indicated that correcting for panel specific 
autocorrelation was more appropriate than correcting for a common autocorrelation 
structure. 
To control for each of these concerns a linear regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors model (Beck and Katz, 1995) was implemented with the options to 
account for the previously described statistical issues. In addition, some control variables 
have been lagged one year to mitigate potential reverse causality problems and to 
account for the “memory” assumption. This is recommended by Nathaniel Beck (1991) 
who stresses that lagging independent variables implies that migrant workers express 
“memory” when evaluating where to remit21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Beck (1991) claims that the “no memory” assumption suggests remitters would not consider prior 
information when assessing where to remit. 
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7. RESULTS 
 
The results for the determinants of outflows of remittances are found in Table 2. 
The models (1-5) are presented sequentially with the first four representing a different 
grouping of regions used in the analysis. The fifth model uses the aggregate regional 
collection but introduces the contextual variables as rates in the model. The models 2-5 
are considered to be robustness checks against the aggregate model, but they offer 
additional insight into the conjectures and confirmation of the results. As seen, each of 
the models is significant. 
With regards to the contextual variables (domestic conditions and regional 
differences), the outcomes are largely as expected, though not always significant. 
Immigration has a positive and significant impact on the outflow of remittances. This is 
effect is consistent across each of the models, though to varying degrees. Similarly, 
lower levels of corruption (higher values on the index) have a positive impact of 
remittance outflows. However, the effects are inconsistently significant across the 
models, thereby offering less concrete support that corruption is a meaningful influence 
on remitters‟ decision to migrate to a host state or the ability to remit more income from 
the host state. The same corruption results apply to the regional environment 
(differentiation) except the coefficients are insignificant across all the models. 
Population effects are in the expected negative direction but do not have a significantly 
detrimental impact on the ability of the host state to pull in (attract) foreign labor or push 
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out more remittances. Likewise, domestic conditions of internal conflict are shown to 
negatively, but insignificantly affect remittance outflow. 
 
Table 2 
The Effects of Institutional Promotions, Domestic Conditions, and 
Regional Differences on Remittance Outflows (1990-2004) 
 (1) Aggregate (2) Relevant (3) Contiguous (4) ILO (5) Rates 
History      
Remittance Outflow
a
 -0.284 -0.277 -0.247 -0.266 -0.030 
 (0.189) (0.183) (0.183) (0.178) (0.161) 
Institutional 
Promotion 
     
Freedom of Movement 10.707* 10.604 12.802 13.246 16.339 
 (5.978) (7.324) (9.713) (8.473) (9.172) 
Migrant Workers 4.929** 4.907* 6.863* 6.909* 10.335** 
 (2.293) (2.868) (4.124) (4.192) (5.168) 
PT Labor Migration 2.724* 2.685* 4.624* 5.481* 5.981* 
 (1.701) (1.625) (2.672) (3.282) (3.338) 
Ex. Rate Type -0.235* -0.248 -0.779 -0.820* -0.823* 
 (0.132) (0.228) (0.642) (0.453) (0.441) 
Remittance 12.231** 11.958* 20.369* 19.888** 24.991** 
 (5.952) (6.746) (12.301) (9.844) (12.034) 
FM Capital 1.185* 1.155* 2.003* 2.204** 2.610** 
 (0.698) (0.520) (1.039) (0.973) (1.160) 
Domestic Conditions      
Immigration
d
 2.690** 3.853** 4.388* 4.011** 5.529* 
 (1.255) (1.943) (2.629) (1.993) (3.051) 
Population
d
 -7.478 -9.146 -13.491 -12.812 -78.939 
 (7.775) (10.284) (11.332) (14.973) (153.25) 
Internal Conflict
b;d
 -4.272 -3.759 -29.877 -28.507 -14.849 
 (37.422) (37.150) (35.698) (34.639) (88.972) 
Corruption
b;d
 1.610* 1.593 1.690 2.106* 5.302 
 (0.878) (1.376) (1.268) (1.265) (4.550) 
Unemployment
b;d
 -4.251 -4.175 -2.581 -8.163 -19.095 
 (5.620) (5.627) (4.987) (5.601) (46.023) 
GDP Growth
b;d
 0.039** 0.039** 0.038** 0.030* 0.043** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) 
Income
b;d
 0.008*** 0.001* 0.004*** 0.002** 0.007** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Trade Openness
b;d
 -0.344 -0.346 -0.459 -1.106 -0.418 
 (1.089) (1.084) (1.176) (1.010) (0.898) 
Inflation
b;d
 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.024 -2.576* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.060) (0.049) (1.456) 
Polity
b;d
 2.279 (0.049) 3.282 2.373 -4.164 
 (3.143) (6.134) (4.216) (5.084) (13.397) 
Regime Stability
b
 0.126 0.124 0.122 0.257 0.323 
 (0.211) (0.208) (0.264) (0.203) (0.507) 
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Table 2 
Continued 
 (1) Aggregate (2) Relevant (3) Contiguous (4) ILO (5) Rates 
Regional 
Environment 
     
Internal Conflict
c;d
 32.613* 33.173 50.301* 77.544* 138.687 
 (18.480) (29.301) (29.981) (41.035) (126.276) 
Corruption
b;c;d
 1.629 1.606 1.611 1.993 4.006 
 (1.315) (1.312) (1.215) (1.219) (7.509) 
Unemployment
b;c;d
 -8.921** -6.994 -8.961** -12.515*** -27.787** 
 (3.914) (4.609) (3.948) (4.167) (13.950) 
GDP Growth
b;c;d
 0.531*** 0.533*** 0.451*** 0.500*** 3.041* 
 (0.198) (0.198) (0.172) (0.167) (1.622) 
Income
b;c;d
 -0.555*** -0.556*** -0.474*** -0.491*** -4.005** 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.172) (0.168) (1.910) 
Trade Openness
b;c;d
 2.560*** 2.551*** 3.262*** 1.695* 4.636 
 (0.848) (0.846) (0.953) (0.894) (3.983) 
Inflation
b;c;d
 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.517** 
 (0.0006) (.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.211) 
Polity
b;c;d
 -6.190** -6.255** -7.288*** -6.586*** -60.892 
 (2.464) (2.459) (2.336) (2.356) (81.408) 
Regime Stability
b;c
 0.499 0.499 0.641 0.530 0.701 
 (1.024) (0.925) (1.716) (1.717) (2.420) 
Constant      
Constant -28.89 -27.373 -9.507 -37.977 -53.373 
 (52.151) (51.761) (54.959) (54.961) (85.016) 
Observations 1172 1172 1172 901 1150 
Number of code 104 104 104 78 104 
R
2
 0.692 0.646 0.641 0.587 0.727 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tail test) 
a
 signifies lag of two years 
b
 signifies lag of one year 
c
 signifies the variable is regionally averaged and then differenced from the domestic value 
d
 signifies that the variable has been converted into rates (Model 5 only) 
 
 
The economic contextual variables performed mostly as anticipated. 
Unemployment and inflation have significantly negative impacts on the supply and 
demand dynamics of remittance outflows. However, these effects are only shown to be 
significant relative to the regional environment (the coefficients are significant across all 
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models except the second). It would appear that unemployment and inflation concerns of 
migrants have a meaningful influence when migrants consider the variations between 
their home state and the host state. They are more willing to migrate when the relative 
conditions of foreign states are far superior (lower unemployment and inflation) and 
remit when home conditions are severely lacking. 
Alternatively, economic growth, income, and trade openness all positively affect 
remittance outflow with exceptions of domestic conditions of trade openness and the 
income disparities of the regional environment. Excluding the noted exceptions, each of 
these variables also expresses a significant impact. These results indicate some of the 
strongest, and reasonable, support for the outflow of remittances. Because remittances 
are related to money and capital, any economic conditions which affect the ability and 
capacity to make a suitable income would also affect the ability to remit. Logically, any 
nation with a strong and vibrant economy will not only be relatively attractive to foreign 
labor but it will also provide said labor with the capability to earn, and consequently 
remit more income. 
Lastly, the political conditions are as expected, though the significance of the 
results is largely lacking. The polity and regime stability of the domestic conditions, as 
well as the regime stability comparisons of the regional environment, each positively 
affect the outflow of remittances. The one contradictory result occurred with the polity 
concerns within the regional environment. It seems that remitters have little concern 
about the political conditions of the home and host states. This is not that surprising 
given the previously discussed emphasis and importance of economic conditions. 
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Remitters seemingly are willing to forgo political concerns for economic ones. They 
appear to endure or ignore political repression for economic prosperity and opportunity. 
As noted, some of the results were surprising and contradictory. First, the 
domestic conditions of trade openness negatively influence remittance outflows, though 
the effect is insignificant across all the models. The implication is that individuals are 
not attracted to host states with positive trade accounts, and migrant workers do not have 
the ability or willingness to remit more money. It is possible that high trade accounts 
entail global competition in the sectors primarily occupied by migrant workers. They are 
not only competing against domestic laborers but also against labor in other countries 
(due to outsourcing). Additionally, if a host state does have a high trade balance and is 
presumably outsourcing much of its jobs or is relying on foreign products, individuals in 
home states have no need to leave. They can take the outsourced jobs or find 
employment in one of the sectors that produces goods for the host state. 
Second, the relative amounts of internal conflict within the regional environment 
appear to have a potentially significantly positive impact on the outflow of remittances. 
Across all the models the effects are positive, but in only three of the models (1, 3, and 
5) are the effects significant at over a 90 percent confidence level. These unexpected 
results may be due to the ability of migrants to remit more money to their families in a 
conflicting home state. When there is more conflict in the home state than the host state 
there is obviously a need to remit to families at home. The internal conditions require 
that they receive more capital during the trying times. However, it is possible that the 
conflictive nature of home environment has made it difficult to effectively remit 
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meaningful amounts of income home. Vice versa, when the home state is relatively more 
peaceful than the host nation, it may not only be easier to remit capital into the home 
state, but the internal strife within the host state puts pressure on immigrants to remit as 
much income as possible before they lose their employment or are forced to relocate. 
The polity variables for regional differences are significantly and negatively 
signed implying that when a host state is relatively more democratic than regional home 
states, there is a decrease in remittances. The relatively higher levels of host state 
democracy may create a situation in which a migrant is willing and more able to move 
his/her entire family into the host state. Democracies are often more attractive 
destinations for individuals to reside due to their political freedoms. They also tend to be 
more accepting of political refugees
22
. Therefore, migrant have the incentive and 
capability to move their entire family into a host state. If this occurs, there is no longer a 
need to remit. In this situation, individuals are still attracted toward democratic host 
states, but if they are able to bring their entire family, they do not feel the need to remit 
back to the home state after the fact. 
Lastly, and most surprising is that higher discrepancies between the incomes of 
host and regional homes nations significantly and negatively affect remittance outflow. 
These results indicate that when individuals within the home region earn less than those 
in the host state, migrants are less likely to migrate into and remit from the host state. A 
possible explanation could be similar to that of the political regional environment. When 
the differences between incomes become so vast, it implies that the host state is 
                                                 
22
 This is not always the case but does tend to be the norm. 
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extremely wealthy and the home state is poor. Given this situation, migrants working in 
the host state are earning significantly more than the individuals in their home country. 
Therefore, they have the more capital to bring their families into to the host state either 
by legal or illegal means
23
. The point of emphasis is that the higher levels of earning not 
only provide migrants with superior income by which they are more easily able to afford 
relocation costs for their families, it also offers them an incentive to save money (rather 
than remit) in order to bring their families to a place of greater financial opportunity. 
In addition, migrants who intend to remit most often move into areas where the 
potential income earnings are greater. This makes up the vast majority of migrant 
remitters, so it is unlikely that there are many who travel to areas where the average 
income is less than the home nation. However, the few migrant who actually move to 
destinations of lower incomes have probably done so because they have found and 
become employed at one of the limited number of jobs that pays an income comparable 
to those in the home state. Even though these individuals are in a nation of weaker 
relative income to that of the home country, they still make a respectable earning and are 
thus able to remit a meaningful amount back home. They also likely have little desire to 
spend significant amounts of money in the host nation or bring their families to a nation 
which is less financially viable. Therefore, even in the instances where an immigrant 
migrates to a country with a lower overall income, it is still probable that they remit 
more income than otherwise. 
                                                 
23
 No matter the destination, it cost money to relocate individuals. As the remitter accumulates capital, 
he/she is able to better afford the cost of paying for his/her families relocation costs. These costs may 
simply be associated with standard moving fees (i.e. plane tickets, legalization fees, residency 
documentation costs) or may be more illegitimate in the form of bribes. 
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As for the institutional variables, the results are mostly as anticipated. Labor 
factors which open up more areas of occupation for migrant workers and broadly allow 
migrant workers to remain employed for various amounts of time, are each significant. 
Only labor factors related to decreasing restrictions on immigration was mostly 
insignificant (only significant in model 1), though signed as anticipated. Likewise, 
capital institutional factors that tightly control exchange rates, loosen restraints on 
remittances, and allow for the relatively unrestricted movements of capital, are 
significant as well (the exceptions being exchange rates for models 2 and 3). 
These results offer further evidence that national governments can directly 
impact the ability and extent of remittance outflows. As discussed earlier, migration is an 
inherent precursor for remitting. Logically, if individuals have not migrated to a host 
country, they cannot feasibly remit. Therefore, states enact barriers to prevent such 
migration or introduce institutions that promote the inflow of individuals. Such 
promotions are often done with the intent to minimize specific or general labor 
shortages, but they indirectly affect remittance outflows. The results indicate that with 
regards to controlling the outflow of remittances, legislation targeted specifically at 
migrant labor (rather than all migrants in general) has the greatest impact on encouraging 
remittance outflows. This makes sense given that the legislation is designed and 
implemented to specifically deal with migrants who earn salaries. These are also the 
same immigrants most likely to remit. 
But, the presence of migrant labor does not guarantee remittances. States can and 
do enact legislation designed to control and limit international capital movements, and 
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often specifically remittance flows. However, states often have direct and indirect 
reasons for opening up their borders to capital exchange, including remittances. 
Therefore, even with intense limits and barriers to immigration
24
, if given lax restrictions 
on remitting or international capital movement, migrant workers will remit legally. Once 
again the results support this conclusion. Relatively fixed exchange rates provide 
confidence in remitters' international exchange of money, and legislative institutions 
geared toward the free movement of capital and remittances present remitters with the 
specific capacity and capability to remit. On the other hand, if there exist relatively 
minimal barriers to immigration but high restrictions on capital mobility, migrant labor 
will tend to remit discretely and secretively to avoid the restrictive capital barriers. In 
this case, even though remitting is occurring, the inability to identify it implies that it is 
virtually non-existent. 
Table 3 and the subsequent figures further provide an understanding of the 
relationship and resulting effects of the relationship between labor and capital 
barriers/promotions, especially when national governments have designed the 
institutions with oppositely intended desires with regard to remittance outflows. It 
presents the results of an interaction between modified labor and capital institutional 
variables. The direction and significance for most of the domestic conditions and 
regional variables are similar to those in Table 2. With regard to the institutional 
                                                 
24
 In this scenario, I assume that even if overwhelming barriers to labor mobility prevent any migration, it 
is still possible for illegal aliens to immigrate. There is also the possibility that immigrants may reside in 
the host state if they migrated prior to the extreme labor limitations. 
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barriers, the results in Table 3 indicate that labor and capital barriers have significantly 
positive impacts on the effect of outflow of remittances.  
 
Table 3 
The Interactive Effect of Institutional Barriers on  
Remittance Outflows (1990-2004) 
 (1) 
History  
Remittance Outflow
a
 -0.065 
 (0.151) 
Institutional Barriers  
Labor 14.096** 
 (7.040) 
Capital 15.917** 
 (7.778) 
Labor*Capital -7.627*** 
 (3.156) 
Domestic Conditions  
Immigration
d
 5.794* 
 (3.175) 
Population
d
 -21.407 
 (91.231) 
Internal Conflict
b;d
 -5.123 
 (7.832) 
Corruption
b;d
 1.456 
 (1.193) 
Unemployment
b;d
 -2.131 
 (4.803) 
GDP Growth
b;d
 0.050** 
 (0.022) 
Income
b;d
 0.002** 
 (0.001) 
Trade Openness
b;d
 0.356 
 (0.811) 
Inflation
b;d
 0.003 
 (0.011) 
Polity
b;d
 -2.019 
 (12.980) 
Regime Stability
b
 0.262 
 (0.307) 
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Table 3 
Continued 
 (1) 
Regional Environment  
Internal Conflict
c;d
 17.395 
 (21.343) 
Corruption
b;c;d
 0.127 
 (1.198) 
Unemployment
b;c;d
 -7.960** 
 (3.886) 
GDP Growth
b;c;d
 0.560*** 
 (0.212) 
Income
b;c;d
 -0.631*** 
 (0.191) 
Trade Openness
b;c;d
 2.652** 
 (1.154) 
Inflation
b;c;d
 -0.001** 
 (0.005) 
Polity
b;c;d
 -5.674** 
 (2.681) 
Regime Stability
b;c
 1.995 
 (1.405) 
Constant  
Constant -167.314 
 (107.359) 
Observations 1172 
Number of code 104 
R
2
 0.462 
Prob > chi
2
 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tail test) 
a
 signifies lag of two years 
b
 signifies lag of one year 
c
 signifies the variable is regionally averaged and then differenced from the domestic value 
 
 
Assessing the Labor and/or Capital variables leads to contradictive conclusions. 
Higher levels of labor/capital barriers should theoretically reduce the outflow of 
remittances, not increase them. Although instances of high levels of labor (or capital) 
barriers and simultaneously nonexistent capital (or labor) barriers (measured as zero) 
exist, any conclusions drawn are potentially misleading. From Table 3 it is difficult to 
determine the impact of labor and capital barriers as each fluctuates. Given this limited 
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understanding of the relationship between the institutional barriers, in Figure 3 I present 
the marginal effect of labor barrier changes across the range of capital barriers. The 
marginal effects are compatible with the expectations of hypothesis 7. 
 
Figure 3 
Marginal Effect of Institutional Labor  
Barriers on Remittance Outflows 
 
 
 
Institutional labor barriers have a significant effect on remittance outflows when 
capital barriers are roughly less than 1.5 and greater than 2. When there are relatively 
low levels of capital barriers (<1.5) then labor barriers actually have a positive impact on 
remittance outflows. This is likely because no matter the number of migrants within a 
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host nation, the ease of capital exchange makes it possible to remit considerable amounts 
of remittances effortlessly. However, when capital barriers are relatively high (>2), then 
labor barriers have a negative impact on remittance outflows. Higher levels of capital 
barriers have a reductive impact on the marginal effect of labor barriers, indicating the 
restive nature of capital barriers on remittance outflows. 
Figure 4 offers further support of the interaction between the institutional 
barriers. The figure depicts the effect of institutional capital barriers on remittance 
outflows as being conditioned by institutional labor barriers, and is generally compatible 
with the expectations of hypothesis 8.  
Institutional capital barriers have a significant effect on remittance outflows 
when capital barriers are roughly less than 1 and greater than 2. When there are 
relatively low levels of labor barriers (<1) then capital barriers actually have a positive 
impact on remittance outflows. Regardless of the level of capital barriers, low amounts 
of restrictions on international labor mobility (low labor barriers) means a vast amount 
of migrants may enter a host country relatively unimpeded. Even with restrictive 
international capital exchange policies, the presumably large amount of immigrants 
residing in these host nations will still be able to cumulatively remit vast amounts of 
remittances. Alternatively, when labor barriers are relatively high (>2), then capital 
barriers have a negative impact on remittance outflows. Higher levels of labor barriers 
have a reductive impact on the marginal effect of capital barriers, signifying the restive 
nature of labor barriers on remittance outflows. 
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Figure 4 
Marginal Effect of Institutional Capital  
Barriers on Remittance Outflows 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
Extant literature on remittances is generally limited and convoluted. Previous 
studies have tended to focus on single cases or regions, thereby neglecting broad and 
encompassing theories and hypotheses. The studies also tend to focus on the effects of 
economic determinants on remittances or the effects of remittances themselves. These 
studies have garnered varied findings and do not come to a consensus on primary 
influences of remittances. 
Although this paper has likely not settled the debate over influential factors of 
remittances, it has attempted to further the discussion. I have endeavored to understand 
how states make explicit policies which are intended to reduce the restrictions on capital 
and labor mobility. And, consequently these reductions affect the ability of labor to 
migrate into a host state and migrant workers to remit from the same host state. In 
addition, I analyzed proposed contextual factors expected to influence remittance 
outflows. However, I also operationalized and measured these variables from both the 
perspective of the host state and from the standpoint of differences between levels of 
host and regional home states. This was an attempt to alleviate some of the 
methodological and measurement issues inherent with the aggregate and non-dyadic 
remittance data, as well as simultaneously analyzing the supply (push) and demand 
(pull) mechanisms associated with remittance outflows. 
Ultimately, the results indicate that host states do have significant and 
meaningful abilities to manipulate remittance outflows via institutional policies. Labor 
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policies and legislation directed specifically at labor can improve remittance outflows. 
Similarly, capital institutions designed to alleviate restrictions on international capital 
exchange promote the outflow of remittances. Further, interactions between capital and 
labor barriers create surprising results. Operational barriers geared solely toward 
reducing either capital or labor mobility have minimal, if not opposite, effects on 
remittance outflows. However, a combination of labor and capital barriers functions to 
effectively limit and reduce the outflow of remittances. 
In addition, I discovered that the influences of contextual factors often varied 
between the effects associate with domestic conditions and the effects as they related to 
regional differences. The dynamics that attract an individual toward a host state or 
encourage them to remit home often vary from the dynamics that push them from their 
home state or provide them with the ability to remit from the host state. 
As seen, developing the theories of determinants of remittances is a prolific and 
logical undertaking. This effort undoubtedly will extend and improve the understudied 
and under-appreciated influences and causes of remittances, which has largely been 
ignored in political science. Additionally, it is safe to assume that remittance flows have 
a significant impact on other, more studied capital such as FDI and PI. Analyzing the 
causes and constraints on remittance can presumably help researchers better delineate 
the interrelationship between all three capitals. Lastly, understanding the causes of 
remittances can aid us in our comprehension of the motivations of remitters and how 
nations can make strides to control or further these capital flows. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Capital: This is an ordinal measure for the extent of institutional capital mobility 
barriers. It is a scale from 0 to 3, whereby 0 indicates minimal barriers and 3 
depicts high amounts of institutional restrictions. The variable is derived from a 
modification of the three ordinal labor institution variables (Ex. Rate, 
Remittance, and FM Capital). Remittance is re-scaled as a dichotomous measure 
in which a 0 indicates the presence of at least one norm or instrument intended to 
deregulate or limit restrictive capital institutions, and a 1 represents the absence 
of any such institution. FM Capital is re-scaled as a dichotomous variable in 
which 0 indicates the presence of at least one BIT, and 1 depicts the absence of 
any BIT membership. Lastly, Ex. Rate is re-scaled as a dichotomous variable 
whereby a 1 indicates an exchange rate type of 7-13, while a 0 represents an 
exchange rate type of 1-6. The three measures are then added together to form 
the ordinal scale (0-3) for the Capital variable. 
Corruption: This factor relies on Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI), which measures the level of corruption in 152 countries, to 
determine the freedom from corruption scores of countries that are also listed in 
the Index of Economic Freedom. The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in which a 
score of 10 indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very 
corrupt government. In scoring freedom from corruption, the authors convert 
each of these raw CPI data to a 0-100 scale by multiplying the CPI scores by 10. 
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The data are gathered from the Heritage Foundation 
(http://www.heritage.org/index/) via the Quality of Government database. 
Economic Growth: This is the estimate of the growth (difference between years) in 
GDP. The data was initially collected from the Penn World Tables 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). However, in order to fill in gaps in the Penn World 
Tables, Gleditsch has imputed missing data by using an alternative source of data 
(the CIA World Fact Book), and through extrapolation beyond available time-
series (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/ksg/exptradegdp.html). 
Ex. Rate Regime: Based on the operationalization derived from Bubula and Otker- 
Robe (2002), this is an ordinal scale of de facto exchange rate regimes. They are 
operationalized as: 1=another currency as legal tender; 2=currency union; 
3=currency board; 4=conventional fixed peg to single currency; 5=conventional 
fixed peg to basket; 6=pegged within a horizontal band; 7=forward looking 
crawling peg; 8=forward-looking crawling band; 9=backward-looking crawling 
peg; 10=backward-looking crawling band; 11=tightly managed floating; 
12=other managed floating; and 13=independently floating. 
FM Capital: This is a measure for the relative free movement of capital. It is measured 
as the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in which a host state is a 
member. Only BITs which are associated with nations in geographical vicinity 
are counted, as well as those which have explicit amendments allowing for free 
movement of capital across borders. Data are gathered from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (http://www.unctad.org). 
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Freedom of Movement: This is a measure of the number of institutional policies 
designed to alleviate barriers to the free movement of individuals across borders. 
It is operationalized as the total number of existing norms and instruments 
deregulating migration at the national level. Data are gathered from the 
International Organization for Migration: Law Database 
(http://www.imldb.iom.int/section.do). 
Immigration: This is a measure for the inflow of migrants per year. The data are logged 
to deflate the numbers and improve statistical interpretation. The data is collected 
from the International Labor Organization. (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). 
Income: This is the estimate of real GDP per Capita in constant US dollars at base year 
2000. The data was initially collected from the Penn World Tables 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). However, in order to fill in gaps in the Penn World 
Tables, Gleditsch has imputed missing data by using an alternative source of data 
(the CIA World Fact Book), and through extrapolation beyond available time-
series (http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/ksg/exptradegdp.html). 
Inflation: Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
and shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit 
deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local 
currency. Data are derived from the World Development Indicators (2006) 
database and is squared in order to more fully capture the volatility of inflation. 
Internal Conflict: These conflicts occur between the government of a state and internal 
opposition groups. The measure is operationalized as: (0) No internal conflict, (1) 
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Internal minor armed conflict, (2) Internal intermediate armed conflict, and (3) 
Internal war. Armed conflicts are classified as: Minor armed conflict - At least 25 
battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period; Intermediate armed 
conflict - More than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history 
of more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year; War - At 
least 1000 battle-related deaths per year. The data is garnered from the 
UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database is a free resource of information on armed 
conflicts of the world (http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict). 
Labor: This is an ordinal measure for the extent of institutional labor mobility barriers. 
It is a scale from 0 to 3, whereby 0 indicates minimal barriers and 3 depicts high 
amounts of institutional restrictions. The variable is derived from a modification 
of the three ordinal labor institution variables (Freedom of Movement, Migrant 
Workers, and PT Labor Migration). Each of the three ordinal labor institution 
variables is re-scaled as a dichotomous measure in which a 0 indicates the 
presence of at least one norm or instrument intended to deregulate or limit 
restrictive labor institutions, and a 1 represents the absence of any such policy. 
The three measures are then added together to form the ordinal scale (0-3) for the 
Labor variable. 
Migrant Worker: This measures the number of institutional devices related to the types 
of employments for migrants. It is operationalized as the total number of existing 
norms and instruments which decreases regulations against migrant occupations 
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at the national level. Data are gathered from the International Organization for 
Migration: Law Database (http://www.imldb.iom.int/section.do). 
Polity: This is an ordinal measure of the level of polity in a given country. The POLITY 
score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score; 
the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). The data are available from the Polity IV Project 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
Population: This is the estimate of the total population of a country. The data are logged 
to deflate the numbers and improve statistical interpretation. The data was 
initially collected from the Penn World Tables (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). 
However, in order to fill in gaps in the Penn World Tables mark 5.6 and 6.2 data, 
Gleditsch has imputed missing data by using an alternative source of data (the 
CIA World Fact Book), and through extrapolation beyond available time-series 
(http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/ksg/exptradegdp.html). 
PT Labor Migration: This is a measure of the number of institutional rules guiding 
employment (permanent and temporary) of foreign labor, and is operationalized 
as the total number of existing norms, instruments, and policies deregulating 
cross-border worker employment at the national level. Data are gathered and 
quantified from the International Organization for Migration: Law Database 
(http://www.imldb.iom.int/section.do). 
Regime Stability: Stability is operationalized as the number of years since the most 
recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY score over 
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a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack 
of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In 
calculating the stability value, the first year during which a new (post-change) 
polity is established is coded as the baseline year zero (value = 0) and each 
subsequent year adds one to the value of the stability variable consecutively until 
a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are entered for all years 
beginning with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if 
that event occurred after 1800. The data are available from the Polity IV Project 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
Remittance: This is a measure of the number of institutional policies related to the 
exchange of capital across borders in the form of remittances. It is 
operationalized as the total number of existing norms and instruments 
deregulating or diminishing the restrictions on remittance outflows at the national 
level. Data are gathered from the International Organization for Migration: Law 
Database (http://www.imldb.iom.int/section.do). 
Remittance Outflow: Workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees comprise 
current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by 
nonresident workers. Workers remittances are classified as current private 
transfers from migrant workers who are residents of the host country to recipients 
in their country of origin. They include only transfers made by workers who have 
been living in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their 
immigration status. Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who 
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have lived in the host country for less than a year. Migrants‟ transfers are defined 
as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the host country for 
more than one year that is transferred from one country to another at the time of 
migration. Data are derived from the World Development Indicators database, 
converted to real dollars (base year 1990), and divided by 1000000 to improve 
statistical interpretation (http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2006/). 
Trade Openness: This measure is operationalized as Exports plus Imports divided by 
real GDP, and is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The data are collected 
from the Penn World Tables (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/). 
Unemployment: This is a measure of the total unemployment as a percent of the total 
labor force. Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without 
work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country. Data are available from the World 
Development Indicators database (http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2006/). 
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